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INTRODUCTION 
The issue of standing in judicial review proceedings has been the subject of significant 
attention over the last few years, both directly from government and the courts. Standing 
(“locus standi”) is concerned with whether or not the individual is entitled to invoke the 
court’s jurisdiction and, in judicial review proceedings, which involves consideration of 
matters of government policy and practice, the restrictiveness of such rules is a matter of 
great constitutional significance.  Ever since Lord Diplock’s comments in Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v National Federation for the Self Employed and Small Business Limited1 
(“IRC”) that the restrictive approach to standing created a “grave lacuna” which risked 
undermining the rule of law, the court’s approach, with some notable exceptions, has been 
largely characterised as relaxed and had generally become viewed as a low threshold test.2 
 
The test for standing is laid down in section 31(3) Senior Courts Act 19813 and requires the 
applicant to have “sufficient interest” in the matter to which the application for permission to 
apply for judicial review relates. In the period since Lord Diplock’s comments in IRC, the 
appellate court’s judgments on standing, with a few notable exceptions, have gone in favour 
of applicants for judicial review. However, in the last five years, the fundamentally liberal 
approach characterised by such cases as R v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs ex parte World Development Movement (“WDM”),4 has been the 
subject of scrutiny both in the court itself and in the wider political environment. A recent 
spate of cases5 and proposed reforms of the judicial review system6 have again brought the 
issue of standing to the foreground when it could well be argued that was one which rarely 
raised its head in judicial review proceedings since the decisions in the mid-1990s. 
 
The current government, driven largely by the Lord Chancellor7, is clearly keen to reform the 
process of judicial review. The Lord Chancellor has expressed the concern that the expansion 
of judicial review since the 1980s has fuelled unmeritorious claims “which may be brought 
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simply to generate publicity or to delay implementation of a decision that was properly 
made”.8 These cost the country both: 
…because a  significant proportion of these weak applications are funded by the tax 
payer – through the expense incurred by the defendant public authority, by the court 
resource entailed, and in some cases by legal aid or by the public authority bearing the 
claimant’s legal costs…9 
and because of the “impact these judicial reviews are having on the country as a whole”.10   
Specifically, the proposed reforms of the judicial review process included proposals to reform 
the rules relating to standing. In their most recent consultation paper “Judicial Review - 
Proposals for Further Reform11” (following quickly on from the paper in 2012 entitled 
“Judicial Review Proposals for Reform”12) the Ministry of Justice expressed the concern that: 
…too wide an approach is taken to who may bring a claim, allowing judicial reviews 
to be brought by individuals or groups without a direct and tangible interest in the 
subject matter to which the claim relates, sometimes for reasons only of publicity or 
to cause delay.13 
The proposals were roundly opposed by those who responded to the consultation, citing well-
rehearsed arguments that restricting the test would move the focus of judicial review from 
challenging public wrong to protecting private rights and that many meritorious claims would 
not otherwise be brought if the liberal rules which allowed representative groups to bring 
claims were not retained.14 The powerful judgment of the Court of Appeal in the WDM 
case15 was much cited in replies to the consultation which stressed the importance of ensuring 
that abuses of power by government did not go unchecked because of the lack of someone 
able to bring a challenge. Notably, the senior judiciary in their response to the second 
consultation invoked the link, central to the WDM case judgment, that a liberal approach to 
standing was vital to uphold the rule of law and ensure that abuse of power did not go 
unchecked:  
The test of standing in judicial review must be such as to vindicate the rule of law. 
Unlawful use of executive power should not persist because of the absence of an 
available challenger with a sufficient interest. The existing test of standing meets that 
requirement and we do not consider there to be a problem with it.16   
The vigour with which the judicial review reform agenda is being pursued elsewhere, for 
example in the recent debates during the passage of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act17, 
may also be reflected in government lawyers’ approach to standing in cases. It could be that 
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recent successes emboldened the government to seek to challenge the approach to standing 
more generally.  
The issue of standing has been complicated by the introduction of differing legal tests 
(“victim”, “person aggrieved”, “direct and individual concern”) depending on the area of law 
(respectively, human rights18, environmental challenges19, European Union law challenge20). 
Notably, within the context of public procurement and privatisation of government services, 
applicants in recent cases have found themselves successfully thwarted by arguments on 
standing. In R (on the application of Gillian Chandler) v Secretary of State for Children, 
Schools & Families and others21, for example, the court held that a parent of a child in a local 
authority area had no standing to challenge a decision to grant a local school academy status.  
Similarly, in R (on the application of Unison) v NHS Wiltshire Primary Care Trust and 
others22, the trade union Unison had its standing successfully challenged when it attempted to 
challenge an NHS Primary Care Trust’s decision to outsource NHS services to private 
providers. Both judgments were referred to in the case discussed here.   
The case of R (on the application of O) v Secretary of State for International Development 
may have seemed to the government’s lawyers like a case in which standing could easily be 
challenged, especially as it was brought by a non-UK national from outside of the 
jurisdiction. However, the argument that O, as a non-national should not be granted standing 
to challenge a decision of the UK government was one which Mr Justice Warby was reluctant 
to accept. 
THE FACTS 
O is Ethiopian. He claimed he was subject to human rights abuses in the course of the 
Ethiopian government’s programme of resettlement of villagers under the “Commune 
Development Programme”, described in court as a process of “villagisation”. Because of the 
brutal way in which this policy was applied, the claimant fled to Kenya. The claimant alleged 
that the Ethiopian government’s programme was in fact funded by the Department for 
International Development’s “Promotion of Basic Service” programme, a fund of some £510 
million which is to be spent by 2018. The grant of development funding (under section 1of 
the International Development Act 2002) has to take place in accordance with departmental 
policy as set out in “Partnerships for Poverty Reduction: Rethinking Conditionality”. That 
required, amongst other things, that the UK government reconsiders finance where donee 
governments are found to be in significant violation of human rights. 
THE ISSUES ARISING 
The claimant’s application to challenge the funding was based on two grounds. The first was 
that the Secretary of State had failed to put in place any process by which Ethiopia’s 
compliance could be assessed. The second was that the Secretary of State had refused to 
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make any assessment public. The claimant sought permission for judicial review and the 
Secretary of State raised the issue of standing at the application for permission. 
It is interesting to pause at this point and reflect on the landmark decision in WDM; again, the 
central issue was standing and the subject matter the issue of statutory overseas aid. In that 
case, a pressure group, the World Development Movement, successfully challenged the then 
government’s decision to grant aid to Malaysia to construct the Pergau Dam. Though the 
issue of standing was central, what was very different in WDM was the status of the 
applicant. In WDM, the entity challenging had no direct connection with the country in which 
the aid was being spent. It gained its standing, according to the court, as a body with a 
legitimate concern in the issues given its expertise in overseas development issues. It was not 
directly affected, in the normal sense of the words, but the matter was one of legitimate 
public concern and it was not that most reviled of judicial review participants, the notorious 
“busybody”.  
The argument on standing put forward by the government was that O had to show either that 
he had himself been “affected in some identifiable way” by the decisions challenged, or that 
the claim involved issues of real and significant public interest which would not otherwise be 
raised, such that the rule of law required the challenge to proceed.  
The first of these tests derived from dicta of Arden LJ in Chandler (cited and applied by Eady 
J in Unison)23. The second derived from the judgment of Lord Reed in Walton v The Scottish 
Ministers24 which, quoting Lord Hope in AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate25, states 
that a personal interest need not be shown if the individual is acting in the public interest and 
can genuinely say that the issue directly affects the section of the public that he seeks to 
represent. 
The government, as well as arguing that O had not shown a personal interest, (which itself 
seems a difficult line of argument in the circumstances) submitted that the requirement of a 
significant public interest was not met and that the rule of law did not require this challenge 
to proceed.  
For O, it was argued that the test of standing derived from Chandler was specific to its 
context, and narrower than the general test. Standing, it was argued, had to be treated “in the 
overall legal and factual context of the case”. As the claim raised serious public interest 
issues arising from the acknowledged need to ensure that development aid does not go to 
governments involved in grave human rights breaches, O could not be categorised as a mere 
busybody. He had a credible basis for arguing that UK aid had contributed to the human 
rights violations of which he complained.  
THE JUDGMENT 
Mr Justice Warby granted permission for the claimant’s application to proceed to a full 
hearing, accepting that there were arguable grounds that the Secretary of State had failed to 
put into place a process by which Ethiopia’s compliance could be assessed while rejecting the 
second ground of challenge. He accepted that the applicant, clearly, had standing to bring the 
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claim and accepted that neither Chandler nor Unison should be treated as providing 
authoritative guidance on the right approach to standing in O’s case. Echoing both Lord Reed 
in Walton and Lord Justice Rose in WDM, he stressed the significance of and sensitivity to 
context in a decision on standing. Rejecting the government’s two pronged approach outlined 
in submissions he stated: 
1. the court should avoid an unduly restrictive approach, which treats judicial review 
exclusively as a means of redressing individual grievances;  
2. the concept of a “sufficient interest” is not one that lends itself to exhaustive 
definition, but is inherently elastic depending on the particular context and 
circumstances; 
3. a person will not have standing if they are a mere busybody in the sense that they are 
interfering in a matter in which they have no personal interest and no reasonable or 
legitimate concern;  
4. it is not necessary to demonstrate a personal interest if the individual is acting in the 
public interest and can genuinely say that the issue directly affects the section of the 
public that he seeks to represent.  
COMMENT 
To some extent, the decision clarifies rather than develops the law on standing, stressing the 
importance of context, reiterating that judicial review is not simply a means of dealing with 
specific individual grievances and emphasising the vital role it plays in holding government 
to account through the rule of law.  
It also, though, acts as a very clear indication that holding government to account through the 
courts is not something of peculiar concern to those who can argue a direct and tangible 
interest (ironically, perhaps, in a case where the applicant, albeit not a citizen, had a very 
direct tangible concern as to the impact of a government policy). The cases of Chandler and 
Unison both involve specifically the process of public procurement and outsourcing; as such, 
they should be viewed as judgments largely limited to cases involving such issues. The 
expansive approach to standing envisaged by Lord Diplock and asserted over the last 30 
years or so seems likely to remain, despite restrictions in particular areas of policy. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
By allowing standing in this case, the Court is recognising both the crucial importance of a 
liberal approach to standing to ensure that abuses of power do not go unchecked and that such 
challenges need not come from citizens but are an available method for anyone affected by 
UK government policy to challenge government action.  
Despite the politicians’ rhetoric and their obvious and perhaps inevitable dislike of a judicial 
process which is open to both pressure groups and foreigners, the judiciary seems implacably 
opposed, both within the courts and through responses to consultation to see judicial review 
significantly limited. The government, however, as evidenced by the recent attempts to 
reform judicial review,26 seems intent on trying to curb its use.  
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The collision between elected politicians and former judges has been played out most 
recently in the House of Lords in recent debates over proposed reforms in the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act27 which, amongst other things, attempts to make financial contributors 
to a judicial review action and interveners potentially liable for costs.  The forcefulness with 
which the Coalition government has pursued its objective to restrain judicial review is also 
evident in the approach taken by the government’s lawyers over the issue of standing, though 
in this case, those attempts were unsuccessful. Now the Criminal Justice and Courts Act has 
received Royal Assent, it is likely that the conflict over the use of judicial review will 
continue in the courts. Indeed, it will be interesting to see if the scenario envisaged by Lord 
Steyn in Jackson,28 in which access to the courts is significantly restricted, may well see the 
court being asked to consider whether or not the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
should be revisited in the name of upholding the Rule of Law.  
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